Habeas corpus: gender-based stereotypes., the official text

An act to amend Section 1473.5 of the Penal Code, relating to evidence.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

Existing law authorizes every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of that imprisonment or restraint. Existing law also authorizes a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis that competent and substantial expert testimony relating to intimate partner battering and its effects was not presented to the trier of fact at the trial court proceedings and is of such substance that, had the competent and substantial expert testimony been presented, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction or sentence, that the result of the proceedings would have been different.
This bill would additionally authorize a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis that evidence or argument likely to trigger gender-based stereotypes was admitted or relied upon by the prosecution at trial in a manner that created a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if such evidence was not admitted or argument offered. The bill would provide that evidence or argument likely to trigger gender-based stereotypes includes, but is not limited to, information concerning a defendant’s sexual activity, sexual orientation, sexual partners, reproductive choices, gender presentation, clothing, or romantic relationships, when offered in a matter that may invoke gender-based stereotypes.
The California Constitution provides for the Right to Truth-in-Evidence, which requires a 23 vote of the Legislature to exclude any relevant evidence from any criminal proceeding, as specified.
Because this bill may result in the exclusion of evidence that would otherwise be admissible in a criminal proceeding, the bill would require a 23 vote of the Legislature.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) Gender bias in criminal proceedings undermines the fairness, accuracy, and integrity of verdicts and sentencing decisions. When criminal liability is assessed through stereotypes about sexuality, parenting, appearance, emotionality, or conformity to gender roles, verdicts may rest on prejudice rather than proof. Such bias harms not only individual defendants, but public confidence in the justice system as a whole.
(b) Gender bias often intersects with other forms of bias, including race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, socioeconomic status, and experiences of trauma or abuse. These intersectional biases can compound prejudice and distort factfinding. Implicit bias, even when unintentional, may produce injustice comparable to explicit bias.
(c) The California Supreme Court has expressly cautioned against the use of gendered assumptions in criminal prosecutions. In People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 318, the Court emphasized that “prosecutors and courts must take care to ensure that this type of gender bias does not infect our criminal justice system,” warning against reliance on generalized assumptions about maternal instinct, intuition, or a woman’s purported nature as a basis for criminal liability.
(d) According to the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code’s 2025 Annual Report, California law should be updated to require heightened judicial scrutiny of gender-biased evidence and argument in criminal trials. In support of this recommendation, the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code provided examples of California cases where evidence or argument improperly relied on gender bias in criminal trials. In one case, the prosecution argued that a woman’s same-sex attraction provided a motive for sexual abuse—a claim the appellate court later found irrelevant and prejudicial. In another, prosecutors introduced a photo of the defendant lying nude in bed covered with cash to prove the defendant’s financial motive for the killing, contributing to a death sentence that was later overturned.
(e) It is the intent of the Legislature to make clear that gender bias, including intersectional gender bias, has no legitimate role at any stage of criminal proceeding, and that courts must exercise heightened vigilance to ensure that proceedings are not infected by prejudice masquerading as proof.

SEC. 2.
Section 1473.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
1473.5.
(a) A writ of habeas corpus also may be prosecuted on the basis that competent and substantial expert testimony relating to intimate partner battering and its effects, within the meaning of Section 1107 of the Evidence Code, was not presented to the trier of fact at the trial court proceedings and is of such substance that, had the competent and substantial expert testimony been presented, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction or sentence, that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Sections 1260 to 1262, inclusive, apply to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to this section. As used in this section, “trial court proceedings” means those court proceedings that occur from the time the accusatory pleading is filed until and including judgment and sentence.
(b) Subdivision (a) is limited to violent felonies as specified in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 that were committed before August 29, 1996, and that resulted in judgments of conviction or sentence after a plea or trial as to which expert testimony admissible pursuant to Section 1107 of the Evidence Code may be probative on the issue of culpability.
(c) A showing that expert testimony relating to intimate partner battering and its effects was presented to the trier of fact is not a bar to granting a petition under subdivision (a) if that expert testimony was not competent or substantial. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish a sufficient showing that competent and substantial expert testimony, of a nature which would be competent using prevailing understanding of intimate partner battering and its effects, was not presented to the trier of fact, and had that evidence been presented, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different.
(d) If a petitioner for habeas corpus under subdivision (a) has previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it is grounds for denial of the new petition if a court determined on the merits in the prior petition that the omission of expert testimony relating to battered women’s syndrome or intimate partner battering and its effects at trial was not prejudicial and did not entitle the petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus.
(e) For purposes of this section, the changes that become effective on January 1, 2005, are not intended to expand the uses or applicability of expert testimony on battering and its effects that were in effect immediately prior to that date in criminal cases.
(f) (1) A writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted on the basis that evidence or argument likely to trigger gender-based stereotypes was admitted or relied upon by the prosecution at trial in a manner that created a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if such evidence was not admitted or argument offered.
(2) For purposes of this subdivision, “evidence or argument likely to trigger gender-based stereotypes” includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(A) Information concerning a defendant’s sexual activity, sexual orientation, sexual partners, reproductive choices, gender presentation, clothing, or romantic relationships, when offered in a matter that may invoke gender-based stereotypes.
(B) Sexually suggestive images or photos.
(C) Evidence related to appearance, dress, or gender expression offered to imply conformity or nonconformity with gender norms.
(D) References to parenting expectations, including a defendant’s purported failure to conform to traditional gender roles.
(E) Appeals to a “woman’s nature,” emotional disposition, or similar generalized gender-based assumptions.